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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
//2A-11/30/82 
AVOCA CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT. 
Respondent, 
Case No. U-5606 
AVOCA CENTRAL SCHOOL TEACHERS 
ASSOCIATION. LOCAL 2479. NYSUT. 
AFT, AFL/CIO. 
Charging Party. 
MARILYN N. NORDINE. for Charging Party 
HENRY M. HILLE, ESQ.. for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the 
Avoca Central School District (District) to a hearing 
officer's decision which found it to have violated 
§209-a.l(d) of the Taylor Law. The alleged violation was 
that it abolished the position of school nurse/teacher, one 
which was within the negotiating unit represented by the 
charging party, and established the substantially similar 
position of school nurse, which it treated as lying outside 
of that negotiating unit. 
Board - U-5606 
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FACTS 
The Avoca Central School Teachers Association 
(Association) represents a unit of "all certified 
personnel" in the District. In April 1981. the District 
established, but did not fill, the position of school 
nurse. Shortly thereafter, it abolished the position of 
school nurse/teacher, which had been within the 
Association's negotiating unit. The position of 
nurse/teacher had required both a nursing license and 
teaching certification. In creating the school nurse 
position, the District dropped the latter requirement, and 
treated the position as being outside the Association's 
unit. The District offered the new position to Ahrens, 
who, up to that time, had served as nurse/teacher. Ahrens 
accepted under protest. Her salary as school nurse was set 
approximately $2300 lower than that which she had received 
as nurse/teacher. 
DISCUSSION 
A public employer is not obligated to negotiate the 
nature or extent of the services that it chooses to provide 
to its constituency.— As such, it may unilaterally 
abolish unit positions and create nonunit positions having 
significantly different duties and functions than those of 
1/New Rochelle CSD. 4 PERB ir3060 (1971) 
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the unit positions it abolishes. Where, however, a public 
employer abolishes a unit position and creates in its stead 
a nonunit position having substantially the same duties and 
functions as those of the abolished unit position, its 
action does not involve a decision relating to the extent 
or nature of services to be rendered, and as such, 
generally falls within the realm of mandatory 
negotiations.— 
On the record before her, the hearing officer found 
the duties of school nurse/teacher and those of school 
nurse to be essentially the same. Having reviewed that 
record, we affirm the hearing officer's conclusion. As 
) nurse/teacher, Ahrens had not been assigned regular 
teaching responsibilities. She had sporadically addressed 
a few classes when request was made of her by regular 
classroom teachers, but did so under their immediate 
supervision. Ahrens1 only unsupervised instructional 
activity as nurse/teacher amounted to a single, annual 
half-hour lecture to fifth grade girls. It is therefore 
clear that teaching was not a significant aspect of the 
nurse/teacher's actual duties. In all other material 
2/ North Shore UFSD. 10 PERB 1P082 (1971). 11 PERB 
IPOll (1978); see also. Northport UFSD. 9 PERB 1f3003 
(1976), aff'd 54 AD2d 935 (2d Dept.. 1976). 9 PERB T7021 
and East Ramapo CSD. 10 PERB 1f3064 (1977). 
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respects, the duties of nurse/teacher and school nurse were 
virtually identical. Indeed, the District's own witness, 
Giacomi. testified that the District's action was taken in 
order to provide essentially the same services at a lower 
cost. 
The main thrust of the District's exceptions in this 
regard concerns differences in potential rather than actual 
job duties. It argues that the positions of school 
nurse/teacher and school nurse are dissimilar because the 
former has teaching capability owing to its certification 
requirement. In support of its argument, the District 
cites numerous judicial decisions which have held that the 
two positions are not "similar" within the intendment of 
§2510.1 of the Education Law. These cases have no binding 
effect upon our interpretation of the Taylor Law, and are 
inapposite given the different aims of the two 
3/ 
statutes.— The hearing officer correctly noted that in 
North Shore UFSD. 10 PERB 1P082 (1977), we implicitly 
rejected the argument that certification and teaching 
potential should be of controlling importance in 
determining the similarity of nurse/teacher and school 
^/Compare the concern for tenure rights underlying 
§2510.1. as set forth in Bork v. No. Tonawanda City School 
District. 60 AD2d 13. (4th Dept.. 1977), with our effort to 
define Taylor Law negotiating obligations, as set forth in 
New Rochelle. supra. 
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nurse positions.— 
The District's unilateral removal of work from the 
Association's negotiating unit was an improper practice 
unless, as in certain cases we have previously decided, the 
facts and circumstances surrounding the action evidence a 
predominant interest relating to the performance of a 
public employer's mission. The hearing officer properly 
found our decision in West Hempstead UFSD. 14 PERB 1P096 
(1981), to be inapplicable. There, we permitted a 
unilateral replacement of unit personnel with nonunit 
personnel due to the District's compelling need to upgrade 
the quality of its cafeteria supervision and thereby 
protect its own property and the safety of its students. 
The hearing officer also correctly ruled that our decisions 
permitting the "civilianization" of positions formerly held 
^J There, we remanded to the hearing officer for 
further evidence of the actual teaching duties of the 
respective positions. Upon receiving the hearing officer's 
report on remand, we found that teaching had been a 
significant aspect of the abolished nurse/teacher position, 
since its duties involved 30-40 hours of unsupervised 
instruction. Creation of the nonunit school nurse position 
eliminated two-thirds of the instructional hours and 
imposed a requirement of direct supervision. On these 
facts, which stand in stark contrast to those present 
herein, we found a substantial change in the nature of the 
job assignment, and held that the District's unilateral . 
action did not constitute an improper practice. 11 PERB 
1P011 (1978). 
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5/ by police officers are inapposite. In those cases.- we 
found the employer's action to primarily involve 
management's fundamental right to determine the employment 
qualifications of personnel performing the tasks therein at 
issue. Here. too. the District's decision to drop the 
requirement of teaching certification for the tasks at 
issue involves the setting of new employment 
qualifications. A critical factor in our civilianization 
decisions, however, was that the employer's action had no 
adverse impact upon terms and conditions of employment, 
since the police officers were simply transferred to other. 
equally compensated unit positions. By contrast, in the 
) present case, the District's decision to alter employment 
qualifications was coupled with a decision to remove Ahrens 
from the Association's negotiating unit and to 
significantly decrease her compensation. The District's 
exercise of its right to establish employment 
qualifications neither requires nor empowers it to 
unilaterally remove Ahrens from the Association's 
negotiating unit to her distinct detriment. 
When an employer simply alters the qualifications for 
a unit position without substantially altering the position 
5/ City of New Rochelle. 13 PERB 1P045 (1980). City 
of Albany. 13 PERB «ir3011 (1980), County of Suffolk. 12 PERB 
1P123 (1979). 
-f- ' 
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itself through a significant change in duties, it may not, 
in conjunction therewith, treat the position as lying 
outside the unit and unilaterally change the terms and 
conditions of employment of the position's 
incumbent. To allow such unilateral action would be to 
allow an employer to circumvent and undermine an employee 
organization's representative status. 
This is not to say that the District may not alter the 
qualifications for the position encompassing the duties 
herein at issue and thus drop the requirement of teaching 
certification. For this reason, the District's exceptions 
to the remedy ordered by the hearing officer have some 
merit. By ordering restoration of the nurse/teacher 
position to the Association's negotiating unit, the hearing 
officer thereby ordered restoration of the teaching 
certification requirement. An appropriate remedy ought not 
interfere with the District's decision to alter employment 
qualifications, but should only address the unilateral 
removal of unit work and unilateral alteration of terms and 
conditions of employment. Thus, while the District need 
not restore the requirement of teaching certification, it 
must continue to negotiate with the Association regarding 
the position now denominated school nurse, since that 
position is in all material respects the same position as 
was previously denominated school nurse/teacher, and 
therefore remains in the Association's unit. 
t 3895• 
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In so ruling, we are not unmindful of the parties' 
collective agreement, which recognizes the Association as 
representative of "all certified personnel." A contractual 
recognition clause, however, does not always accurately 
reflect actual unit work, especially when, as here, it 
defines the unit in terms of job qualifications rather than 
job duties. The actual work of this position, which had 
been treated as being in the unit, did not substantially 
change with the change in the job qualifications or with 
the purported removal of the position from the unit. Since 
teaching for which certification is required was at most a 
minimal aspect of the duties of the nurse/teacher position, 
the recognition clause is not controlling, and does not 
shield the District from its statutory obligation to 
negotiate with the Association concerning a position which 
encompasses unit work. Should there be a dispute as to the 
continued appropriateness of including the school nurse 
position in the Association's negotiating unit, the 
question may be addressed in the parties' future 
negotiations or raised in a representation proceeding 
timely filed with this Board. 
NOW THEREFORE. WE ORDER the Avoca Central School 
District to: 
1. Restore Ahrens to the terms and 
conditions of employment she enjoyed as 
school nurse/teacher, and return to her 
Board - U-5606 -9 
any loss of wages and benefits she 
suffered by reason of the violation 
herein found, from the date of 
abolition of the school nurse/teacher 
position, with interest thereon at the 
rate of three percent per annum, and 
2. Negotiate in good faith with the 
Association concerning the terms and 
conditions of employment of the 
position of school nurse, and 
3. Post the attached notice in those 
locations normally used by the 
District to communicate with the 
employees in the unit represented by 
the Association. 
DATED: November 30, 1982 
Albany, New York 
^ ^ ^ 
arold R. Newman, Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies. Membe 
7897 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOyMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees that the District: 
1.. Shall restore Michaelene Ahrens to the terms and conditions of 
employment she enjoyed as school nurse/teacher, and shall return to 
her any loss of wages and benefits she suffered since the date of 
abolition of the nurse/teacher position, with interest thereon at 
the rate of three percent per annum, and 
2, Shall negotiate in good faith with the Avoca Central School 
Teachers Association, Local 2479, NYSUT, AFT, AFL/CIO concerning 
the terms and conditions of employment of the position of school 
nurse, 




This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. |- d'^w 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
//2B-11/30/82 
CASE NO. U-6263 
In the Matter of 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS. INC.. 
NEW YORK STATE UNITED TEACHERS, and 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS. 
_•-: •^-.::-__.-_ : : ^: ^ ::"_-. - ^  ^ RSSpOnd entS ,. ^ 
-and-
THOMAS C. BARRY. 
Charging Party. 
THOMAS C. BARRY, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of Thomas 
C. Barry to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
dismissing his charge against United University 
Professions. Inc. (UUP), the New York State United 
Teachers (NYSUT) and the American Federation of Teachers 
(AFT). The charge alleges that UUP and its affiliate 
organizations NYSUT and AFT violated §209-a.2(a) of the 
Taylor Law by collecting agency shop fees to which they 
are not entitled. 
Barry asserts three bases for his charge. The first 
is that the refund procedure is inadequate in that the 
j 
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agency shop fees are shared by the three affiliated 
employee organizations but the final appellate step of the 
refund procedure covers only the monies retained by UUP. 
The second is that NYSUT and AFT are not entitled to 
agency shop monies because they are not certified or 
recognized as representatives of the negotiating unit, and 
§208.3(a) of the Taylor Law extends agency shop fee 
privileges to recognized or certified employee 
organizations only. The third is that the statutory 
obligation that he pay an agency shop fee violates Barry's 
religious and philosophical principles and is, therefore, 
unconstitutional. 
Without requiring an answer from the respondent 
employee organizations, the Director dismissed the charge 
on the ground that the facts as alleged could not 
constitute an improper practice as set forth in §209-a of 
the Taylor Law. Barry has filed timely exceptions. 
Having reviewed the charge and the amplification of 
it which Barry submitted at the request of the Director, 
we affirm so much of the Director's decision as dismissed 
the second and third bases of the charge. We have already 
considered the right of a recognized or certified employee 
organization to share its agency shop fees with its 
affiliate organizations and found it to be acceptable so 
long as the refund procedure covers the monies sent by the 
Board - U-6263 -3 
recognized or certified organizations to its affiliates. 
Indeed, the prior decision dealt with UUP. NYSUT and AFT, 
the same respondents as here, UUP (Eson). 11 PERB 1f3068 
(1978). The third basis of the charge would require this 
Board to rule upon the constitutionality of the laws under 
which it operates. This is beyond the power of an 
administrative agency. Cherry v. Brumbaugh. 255 AD 880 
(2d Dept., 1938); Nassau Children's Home v. Board of 
Zoning. 77 AD2d 898 (2d Dept.. 1980). 
Turning to the first basis of Barry's charge, we find 
that facts were alleged which could constitute an improper 
practice. Barry alleges that between 60 and 70 percent of 
the agency shop monies received by UUP go to NYSUT and 
AFT; that neither NYSUT nor AFT has a refund procedure; 
that UUP has a refund procedure with arbitration as the 
final appellate step; and that the arbitration step is 
limited to agency shop fee monies retained by UUP and does 
not extend to monies transmitted to NYSUT and AFT. In 
support of the last allegation, Barry cites the decision 
of one arbitrator who stated that his jurisdiction was 
determined by UUP's submission to him and that the 
submission did not authorize him to "go behind the 
representations of NYSUT and AFT with respect to the 
amount of refund due from the expenditures of each 
organization". To the same effect, Barry quotes a second 
Board - U-6263 -4 
arbitrator as saying that his jurisdiction, as conferred 
by UUP, required him to accept the amounts of the refunds 
of NYSUT and AFT "as is". 
Based upon these allegations, Barry contends that he 
is challenging not the amount of the refund, but the 
process by which the amount is ascertained and by which 
its adequacy may be appealed, a process which insulates 60 
to 70 percent of his agency shop fees from the review 
required by the Taylor Law. Thus, according to Barry, his 
charge sets forth a prima facie case under §208.3(a) of 
the statute. We agree. Finding that the substance of 
Barry's allegations is that UUP has not maintained a 
proper refund procedure, we determine that his allegations 
are sufficient to require the processing of his charge 
under part 204 of our Rules of Procedure. 
UUP is entitled to agency shop fees from Barry and 
from other unit employees who chose not to join, provided 
that it 
has established and maintained a procedure 
providing for the refund to any employee 
demanding the return [of] any part of an 
agency shop fee deduction which represents 
the employee's pro rata share of 
expenditures by the organization in aid of 
activities or causes of a political or 
ideological nature only incidentally related 
to terms and conditions of employment. 
[§208.3(a) of the Taylor Law.] 
The employee organization directly enjoying the agency 
shop fee privilege is free to establish a refund procedure 
that includes internal appellate steps or it may limit the 
• .•MR? 
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agency shop fee payer to a single-step internal refund 
procedure.— In either case, however, the procedure 
must apply to both the part of the agency shop fees that 
it retains and that which it forwards to its affiliates. 
UUP (Eson). 11 PERB ir3068 (1978). This is the clear and 
rational import of the statutory language, which makes 
the direct beneficiary of the agency shop fee privilege 
accountable for all of the agency shop fees it collects 
even though it transmits some of that money to affiliated 
2/ 
organizations to which it is subordinate.— It cannot 
escape that responsibility by claiming that it lacks 
power to impose a refund procedure upon organizations 
) to which it is subordinate. If it cannot obtain 
1/ While UUP has devised a multi-step internal appellate . 
procedure, the amount of the refunds made by other 
unions can be challenged only in a plenary court 
action. Hampton Bays. 14 PERB ir3018 (1981); St. 
Lawrence-Lewis County BOCES Teachers Assn.. 15 PERB 
1P113 (1982). 
2/ Compare, New Hyde Park Unit. Nassau Co. Chapter. 
CSEA. 11 PERB ir3018 (1978). in which we held that the 
Chapter's continuing right to dues deduction and 
agency shop fee privileges depended upon its not 
striking, and that the dues and fees enjoyed by the 
Chapter were indivisible. Thus, by striking, it not 
only lost the part of the dues and fees that it would 
normally have kept but also that which it would 
normally have forwarded to its parent organization, 
CSEA. 
j 
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that power from those organizations as a condition for 
sharing its agency shop fee monies with them, then it 
cannot itself qualify as a recipient of the agency fee 
funds. 
NOW, THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the charge herein be. 
and it hereby is, remanded to the 
Director for further proceedings 
consistent with this decision. 
DATED: November 30. 1982 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
ifefr- /&Zu<^— 
David C. R a n d i e s . Mejrfber 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE. 
Employer-Petitioner, 
-and-
UNIFORMED FIRE FIGHTERS As¥6cIATYON 
OF SCARSDALE. INC.. LOCAL 13 94. 
Intervenor. 
RAINS & POGREBIN. P.C. 
(TERENCE M. O'NEIL. ESQ. and 
ERNEST R. STOLZER, ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Employer-Petitioner 
LOMBARDI, REINHARD. WALSH & HARRISON. P.C. 
(RICHARD P. WALSH, JR.. ESQ.. of Counsel). 
for Intervenor 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Uniformed Fire Fighters Association of Scarsdale. Inc.. 
Local 1394 (Local 1394) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) 
that fire captains employed by the Village of Scarsdale 
(Village) should be removed from the negotiating unit in 
which other firefighters of the Village are represented and 
placed in a separate unit. The bases of his decision are 
his finding that the fire captains supervise the other 
firefighters and his conclusion that a public employer's 
request that supervisors and rank-and-file employees be 
#20-11/30/82 
CASE NO. C-23 21 
') 
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separated for labor relations purposes must be granted. 
Local 1394's exceptions challenge both bases of the decision. 
As to the first basis. Local 1394 asserts that fire 
captains are team leaders who work alongside the 
r^ nTc^ axtd^ f rle employe e^ z^ 
conceding that the captains exercise traditional supervisory 
responsibilities over the rank-and-file firefighters in 
connection with some assignments, it argues that those 
assignments do not occupy the major part of the working time 
of the employees. More importantly, according to Local 
1394. in the fighting of fires, which is the primary 
responsibility of firefighters, all firefighters, regardless 
of rank, constitute a team. 
Addressing the second basis of the Director's decision. 
Local 1394 argues that even if the captains are supervisors, 
the Village's reguest that they and the rank-and-file 
employees be placed in separate units should not be 
granted. In support of this argument, it cites the report 
of the Taylor Committee which rejected a per se rule 
precluding the inclusion of supervisors in rank-and-file 
units.— More particularly, it notes that the captains 
1/ Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations. Final 
Report. March 31. 1966. p. 25. 
Board - C-2321 
) 
and rank-and-file firefighters have been represented in a 
single unit for 26 years and the record contains no evidence 
that this unit structure has caused any bargaining or 
administrative problems for either the employees or the 
-
_
- ---v-i-l-l^ g-e-.-1 ^ B H s e d u p o n ^ the s e- fa ct s, -i t -a rgu es -t hat -tlier u n 11 -- -
satisfies the standards prescribed by §207.1 of the Taylor 
Law. 
In response to Local 1394's position, the Village has 
presented written and oral arguments which support the 
reasoning of the Director. It contends that the captains 
are supervisors even though their function when actually 
fighting fires reflects a greater commitment to teamwork 
than is typical of a normal supervisor-subordinate 
relationship. Indeed, that teamwork is a factor in the 
Village's argument that a per se rule excluding captains 
from the rank-and-file unit is needed. It asserts that to 
prove that the existing unit does not satisfy the standards 
prescribed by §207.1 would require the testimony of some of 
the captains, and the production of that testimony would be 
detrimental to the teamwork approach. 
Having considered the record, we reverse the conclusion 
of the Director. Although we agree with the Director that 
fire captains are supervisors, we do not accept the 
application of a per se rule requiring their separation from 
) the existing unit. Here, there is a 26-year history of 
joint representation which should have been considered in 
-3 
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determining whether the existing unit satisfies §207.1. As 
indicated by us in Buffalo City School District. 14 PERB 
ir3051 (1981), while our assumption might be that a unit 




persuade us otherwise where a combined unit has existed for 
a long period of time without any showing of adverse effect 
on the interests of either group. 
In Buffalo, an employee organization sought to represent 
supervisory employees in a separate unit after 13 years in 
which they had been represented by another organization in a 
unit that also contained rank-and-file employees. In 
support of its petition, the employee organization merely 
alleged that the employees it was seeking to represent were 
supervisors. It neither alleged facts nor introduced 
evidence bearing upon the statutory standards. The petition 
was opposed by the employer and by the employee organization 
representing the existing unit, with the employer making the 
uncontested assertion that its administrative convenience 
would be better served by the continuation of the existing 
unit structure. Determining that the basis of the 
petitioner's case was a presumed conflict of interest 
between the two groups of employees and finding no evidence 
of any manifestation of any such conflict during the 13-year 
) history of the unit, we dismissed the petition. 
"I ' ''WPP 
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Here, an employer seeks the separation of supervisory 
and rank-and-file employees after 26 years of joint 
representation. Its petition is opposed by the only other 
party, the employee organization which represents the 
exf&tirng-uhtt ^  
on the record, that the two groups of employees share a 
community of interest. The basis of the petitioner's case 
is that its administrative convenience requires the 
separation of supervisors from rank-and-file employees so 
that effective supervision will not be subverted. There is, 
however, no evidence whatsoever of any manifestation of such 
a subversion of effective supervision during the 26-year 
history of the unit. Absent such evidence, the existing 
unit should not be disturbed. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is. dismissed. 
DATED: November 30. 19 82 
Albany. New York 
'Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
/^C^C-c^-o^-— 
Ida KJraus, Member 
A 
David C. Randies , Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of #2D-ii/30/82 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY and 
MANHATTAN AND BRONX SURFACE TRANSIT 
OPERATING AUTHORITY. 
Respondents. CASE NO. U-5 6 37 
-and-
SPECIAL INSPECTORS BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION. 
Charging Party. 
JOAN STERN KIOK, ESQ.. for 
Charging Party 
RICHARD K. BERNARD. ESQ.. 
(ROBERT RIFKIN, ESQ.. Of 
Counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Special Inspectors Benevolent Association (Association) to a 
hearing officer's decision dismissing its charge that the 
New York City Transit Authority and Manhattan and Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority (Authorities) violated 
paragraphs (a), (c) and (d)— of subdivision 1 of §209-a 
l^As filed, the charge alleged only violations of 
paragraphs (a) and (c). It was amended during the course of 
the hearing to allege a violation of paragraph (d). We 
therefore reject the Authorities' argument in opposition to 
the exceptions that the Association is precluded from 
asserting that they violated their duty to negotiate in good 
faith. 
:mo 
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of the Taylor Law in that they unilaterally transferred 
duties previously performed by unit employees (called 
special inspectors), to newly hired nonunit employees 
(called confidential investigators), and laid off 30 of 40 
2/ 
special inspectors.— The hearing officer determined 
that the duties assigned to the confidential investigators 
were substantially different from those performed by the 
special inspectors, thus supporting the Authorities' 
position that they did not constitute unit work. 
Accordingly, she found, the Authorities' unilateral action 
did not violate their duty to negotiate with the 
3/ Association.— In the absence of such a duty, she found 
no basis for concluding that the unilateral action was 
improperly motivated and, therefore, violative of paragraphs 
(a) and (c). Finally, she found no evidence that the 
Association had sought to negotiate the impact of the 
layoffs and. consequently, that the Authorities had violated 
no duty to participate in such negotiations. 
^The hearing officer's decision also dismissed a 
related charge made by the Association in case U-5401. As 
no exceptions were filed to that part of the hearing 
officer's decision, the matter is not before us. 
3/cf. Saratoga Springs. 11 PERB ir3037 (1978). affd. 
Saratoga Springs CSD v. PERB. 68 AD2d 202 (3d Dept., 1979), 
12 PERB ir7008, lv. app. den. 47 NY2d 711 (1979). 12 PERB 
T7012. 
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FACTS 
The Association was first told on June 26. 1981 by the 
Authorities that 30 of the 40 positions in its negotiating 
unit would be eliminated one week later and that the 30 
incumbents would be laid off. At that time the Association 
and the Authorities were negotiating for a first collective 
bargaining agreement, such negotiations having commenced 
eight and a half months earlier. One of the demands made by 
the Association during the negotiations was that there be 
"no subcontracting of special inspectors' duties, 
obligations or positions". 
Upon being informed of the projected layoffs. Frederick 
) Laverpool, president of the Association, made three 
unsuccessful attempts to speak to Transit Authority 
president. John D. Simpson. His purpose in seeking those 
meetings was to negotiate job opportunities as confidential 
investigators for the laid off special inspectors. 
At the same time as the Authorities laid off the 30 
special inspectors, they established a new Office of 
Inspector General for which they created 23 confidential 
investigator positions. The amount budgeted for each of 
these positions was somewhat less than the average salary of 
the special inspectors. The duties of the special 
inspectors had been to investigate employee misconduct and 
fraud by vendors. The authority of the new Office of 
i 
Inspector General included the investigation of employee 
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misconduct and vendor fraud, and aspects of crime and 
corruption which had previously been the concern of the 
City's Department of Investigation. After the creation of 
the Office of Inspector General, the responsibilities of the 
special inspectors were restricted to control of employee 
absenteeism and employee sick leave abuse. Only ten special 
inspectors were retained. 
DISCUSSION 
On the record before us, we determine that the 
Authorities violated paragraph (d) of §209-a.l of the Taylor 
Law. but not paragraphs (a) and (c). The Authorities' 
unilateral action was taken in violation of its duty to 
negotiate in good faith. There is insufficient evidence, 
however, of an improper motive for taking the action. 
Although not improperly motivated, the Authorities' 
conduct violated §209-a.l(d) in three particular respects. 
First, it constituted a unilateral reassignment of the unit 
work of special inspectors to the nonunit confidential 
investigators. The job specifications for both titles show 
4/ 
sufficient similarity to support this conclusion.— 
^/Compare Laverpool v. New York City Transit 
Authority, unreported (Kings Co., special term, July 12. 
1982) in which the Court found that for the purpose of Civil 
Service Law Section 86 which provides that an honorably 
discharged veteran or exempt volunteer fireman who was laid 
off should be transferred "to a similar position wherein a 
vacancy exists," the positions of special inspector and 
confidential investigator are similar. V 
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Second, and even more clearly established, the 
Authorities violated their duty to negotiate in good faith 
by failing to inform the Association of the contemplated 
layoffs, particularly as plans for those layoffs were being 
formulated at the very time when the parties were in 
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement, which 
negotiations included a demand prohibiting loss of jobs 
through subcontracting of unit work. The withholding at 
such time of information so crucially affecting the 
employees and the Association was plainly incompatible with 
the basic requirements of good faith bargaining. By failing 
to disclose their plan, the Authorities foreclosed any real 
opportunity for the Association to formulate and negotiate 
specific demands to ease, or perhaps even avoid, the 
hardships the employees would suffer. 
Finally, we determine that the Association did seek to 
negotiate the impact of the layoffs when it learned about 
them and that the Authorities refused to participate in such 
negotiations. Reason dictates, and the Authorities should 
have assumed, that when Laverpool, the Association's 
president, made three unsuccessful attempts to speak to 
Simpson, the Transit Authority's president, about obtaining 
job opportunities for the laid off special inspectors as 
confidential investigators, he was seeking negotiations 
regarding the impact of the layoffs. The Authorities' 
argument, that Laverpool could not have been seeking 
negotiations with Simpson because he knew that the 
,7914 
Board - U-5637 -6 
Authorities' negotiators were Gattuso and Crannan. is not 
persuasive. In view of the failure of Gattuso and Crannan 
to tell the Association about the projected layoffs during 
negotiations, thus frustrating the possibility of impact 
discussions, they should have assumed that when Laverpool 
sought on behalf of the Association to speak to Simpson, he 
was appealing to the president of the Transit Authorities 
for negotiations on impact. 
By reason of the Authorities' refusal to negotiate with 
the Association, we order them to cease and desist from such 
conduct in the future. Moreover, as the Authorities' 
refusal to negotiate included unilateral action that injured 
unit employees, we order them to make the employees whole 
for the injuries suffered as a consequence of that 
unilateral action.— Accepting the Authorities' testimony 
that they were required to lay off employees because of 
financial problems, we do not require them to reinstate all 
the special inspectors who were laid off. We do. however, 
require them to reinstate special inspectors by a number 
equal to that of the nonunit confidential investigators who 
were hired by the Authorities. 
NOW. THEREFORE, WE ORDER the New York City Transit 
Authority and Manhattan and Bronx 
Surface Transit Operating Authority: 
•5/saratoga Springs, supra, at footnote 3. 
U-5637 
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1. To cease and desist from refusing to 
negotiate in good faith with the 
Special Inspectors Benevolent 
Association; and 
2. In accordance with the normal 
appropriate order of reinstatement, to 
reinstate special inspectors in a 
number corresponding to the number of 
confidential investigators who were 
employed by the Authorities and who had 
not previously been special inspectors, 
such reinstated special inspectors to 
be made whole for lost wages with 3 
percent interest thereon and for other 
lost benefits; and 
To post a notice in the form attached 
at all locations ordinarily used to 
communicate information to unit 
employees. 
November 30. 1982 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Membj.^ 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL E 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that: 
1. The New York City Transit Authority will not refuse to negotiate 
in good faith with the Special Inspectors Benevolent Association; 
and 
"i 2. The New York City Transit Authority will, in accordance with the 
normal appropriate order of reinstatement, reinstate special 
inspectors in a number corresponding to the number of confidential 
investigators who were employed by it who had not previously 
been special inspectors, such reinstated special inspectors to 
be made whole for lost wages with 3 percent interest thereon and 
for other lost benefits. 
New York City Transit Authority 
Dated By (Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. , _ 
APPENDIX 
TO ALL EMPLOYEE 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all unit employees that: 
1. The Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority will 
not refuse to negotiate in good faith with the Special Inspectors 
Benevolent Association; and 
2. The Manhattan and Bronx Surface Transit Operating Authority will, 
in.accordance with the normal appropriate order of reinstatement, 
reinstate special inspectors in a number corresponding to the 
number of confidential investigators who were employed by it who 
had not previously been special inspectors, such reinstated 
special inspectors to be made whole for lost wages with 3 percent 
interest thereon and for other lost benefits. 
Manhattan and Bronx Surface 
.Transit. .Operating. Authority. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must hot be altered, 
defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
County of Rensselaer, 
Employer, 
New York State Nurses Association, 
CASE NO. C-24 67 
Petitioner, 
-and-
Rensselaer County Unit of the 
Rensselaer County Local 842, Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc. 
AFSCME/AFL-CIO. Local 1000. 
Intervenor. 
GORDON R. MAYO. ESQ.. for Employer 
HARDER. SILBER & GILLEN, ESQ., 
(RICHARD J. SILBER, ESQS.. of Counsel), 
for Petitioner 
ROEMER & FEATHERSTONHAUGH. ESQS.. 
(DONA S. BULLUCK. ESQ.. of Counsel), 
for Intervenor. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the New 
York State Nurses Association (NYSNA) to a decision of the 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director) dismissing its petition to represent a unit of 
nurses employed by Rensselaer County. The basis of the 
//2E-11/30/82 
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) 
Director's decision is his determination that the 
appropriate unit in which the nurses should be represented 
consists of both nurses and other employees of the 
County. The County and Rensselaer County Unit of the 
R^ss^Xaer CountyE^ 
Association, Inc.. AFSCME/AFL-CIO, Local 1000 (CSEA), 
which now represents both the nurses and other County 
employees, agree with the Director's determination. 
Upon a prior petition filed by NYSNA in April 1968. a 
separate unit of nurses employed by the County was found 
to be appropriate. However. CSEA was victorious in the 
. ensuing election and it was certified as representative of 
the unit. During the following 13 years, CSEA and the 
County negotiated a series of contracts covering the 
County's employees which treated nurses as if they were in 
the same unit as the other County employees. That 13-year 
negotiating history reveals no evidence of a conflict of 
interest between the nurses and the other County employees 
or that the ability of the County or its employees to 
fulfill their joint responsibilities to the public had 
been compromised. Having reviewed the record, we conclude 
that a 13-year history of negotiations between the County 
and CSEA supports the Director's determination. 
'?920 
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The unit decision made in 1968 was based upon an 
assumption that the inclusion of nurses and other County 
employees in a single unit would not satisfy the standards 
set forth in §207 of the Taylor Law. Although the 
orTg iha 1 unit clesi gnat ion ~may"h^ ve^ ^^  - -- - - -
negotiations since that time covered both nurses and other 
County employees and those negotiations have demonstrated 
that a unit comprising nurses and other employees of 
Rensselaer County does satisfy the statutory standards. In 
view of this evidence, we determine that a separate unit 
of nurses employed by Rensselaer County is not appropriate 
and affirm the decision of the Director dismissing the 
petition. 
NOW. THEREFORE. WE ORDER that the petition herein be. 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30. 1982 
Albany. New York 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
Ida Klaus, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
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BOCES OF CHAUTAUQUA COUNTY NON-
INSTRUCTIONAL EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION. 
Intervenor. 
HODGSON. RUSS. ANDREWS, WOODS & 
GOODYEAR. ESQS. (ROBERT M. WALKER. 
ESQ. and DAVID A. FARMELO. ESQ.. 
of Counsel), for Employer 
STEPHEN J. MELCHISKEY and RANDY E. 
RHINEHART. for Petitioner and 
Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This matter comes to us on the exceptions of the 
Chautauqua County Board of Cooperative Educational Services 
(Employer) to a decision of the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director) removing 
two nurses from a unit of noninstructional employees 
represented by BOCES of Chautauqua County Non-Instructional 
••7922 
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Employees Association (Intervenor) and placing them in a 
unit of teachers, dental hygienists and psychologists 
represented by Chautauqua County BOCES Teachers Association 
(Petitioner). The Petitioner and Intervenor. both of which 
are affiliated with the New York Educators Association, 
support the Director's decision. 
The basis of the Director's decision is his conclusion 
that nurses have a closer community of interest with the 
teachers, dental hygienists and psychologists than they do 
with the noninstructional employees. In support of this 
conclusion, he quoted the testimony of one of the nurses 
that: 
We feel that the instructional unit provides 
the more concrete community of interests as 
far as our responsibilities are concerned; we 
feel the Teachers Association offers 
recognition of licensing and educational 
background; we feel that it provides a more 
optimum professional atmosphere for 
advancement and recognition, and we feel that 
it also would offer a chance for advancement 
for ourselves. 
In support of its exceptions, the Employer alleges 
that the position of nurses has been in the 
noninstructional unit since it was created more than six 
years ago. It further alleges that the six-year 
negotiating history covering that unit reveals no evidence 
of a conflict of interest between the nurses and the other 
noninstructional employees or that the ability of the 
Employer or its employees to fulfill their joint 
' 7923 
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responsibilities to the public have been impaired. 
Finally, it alleges that the placement of nurses in the 
noninstructional unit was confirmed in a certification 
issued to the intervenor by this Board two years ago.— 
Having reviewed the record, we find that it supports 
the employer's allegations and. on the facts shown, we 
reverse the decision of the Director. 
The evidence of the nurses' sense of a community of 
interest with the teachers, dental hygienists and 
psychologists is not sufficient to overcome the evidence of 
six years of representation of the nurses in the 
noninstructional unit without any evidence that the 
2/ 
representation was ineffective.— Moreover the unit 
placement of the nurses was reaffirmed two years ago in a 
certification issued to the intervenor by this Board. 
Accordingly, no acceptable reason has been shown for 
1/Chautaugua County BOCES, 13 PERB ir3000.09 (1980) 
i-/we note that the testimony of nurses in Rockland 
County, 10 PERB ir30l4 (1977), that they felt no community 
of interest with the other employees in a county-wide unit, 
was insufficient to justify removing them from that unit. 
Moreover, in Rockland County, but not here, there was some 
evidence that the employee organization representing the 
nurses had not paid as much attention to the nurses' 
concerns as it should have. 
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disturbing the stability of the existing unit structure by 
changing the current unit designation. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the petition herein be, 
and it hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 30, 1982 
Albany, New York 
:W3£^^ 
Harold R. Newman. Chairman 
yfc^^z^ 
Ida Klaus, Member 
David C. Randies, Memb 
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N E W Y O R K S T A T E 
P U B L I C E M P L O Y M E N T R E L A T I O N S B O A E D 
50 W O L F R O A D 
A L B A N Y , N E W Y O R K 12205 
COUNSEL 
MARTIN L. BARR 
CERTIFIED MAIL December 2, 1982 
Charles 0. Ingraham, Esq. 
;J^ swad.-^ ;r:;Irig;raham>^ ._E:sqs. -=—::.--
46 Front Street 
Binghamton> New York 139 05 
Re: Case No. M-81-473 - Yates County 
and Yates County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association 
Dear Mr. Ingraham: 
I have been directed by the Board to advise you that at its 
meeting of November 29-3 0, 1982, it considered the application of 
the Yates County Deputy Sheriff's Association to review the decision 
of the Director of Conciliation denying the petition of the Associa-
tion for interest arbitration pursuant to' Civil Service Law §2 09.4, 
and affirmed the decision of the Director. 
The Board directed, that the following be. placed in the. minutes. 
of its meeting of November 29-30, 1982 as its decision in the matter: 
Case No. M-81-473 -. Yates.County and Yates County 
Deputy Sheriff's Association - The Board affirms 
the decision of.the Director of Conciliation denying 
the.petition of the Yates County Deputy Sheriff's 
Association for interest arbitration pursuant to 
Civil Service Law §209.4. After considering the 
facts and arguments submitted by the Association, 
the Board reconfirms its decision in Erie.County 
Sheriff and Erie County, 7 PERB 1(3057 (1974) that 
a sheriff's department is not an "organized police 
force or police department" within the meaning of 
Civil Service Law §209.4 as amended by Chapter 725 
of the Laws of 1974. 
MLB/mk 
Very truly yours, 
[l{//(htu 
Martin L. Barr' 
Counsel 
6^L._ 
cc: John M. Sheridan, Esq. 
Jan S. Scofield, Sheriff, Yates County 
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